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RedistrictingI stands at the heart of our notions of representative democracy
because it serves as a key mediating factor between voters' preferences and
electoral outcomes, determining, in large part, how well citizens are
represented. Meaningful reforms are needed now more than ever to correct
problems that stem from partisan gerrymandering. This Note endeavors to
provide legislators, policymakers, and election reform advocates with a
greater empirical understanding of redistricting reform proposals and their
effect on the electoral process. By analyzing 4,422 district-level elections,
conducted under three different redistricting processes, held over the course of
twenty years, this Note also provides a clear roadmap for reform. As
displeased voters increasingly turn their attention toward legislative, rather
than judicial remedies, they should pursue nonpartisan redistricting
commissions that utilize a combination of citizen participation and legislative
endorsement of proposed district maps. These reforms will best increase
electoral responsiveness and reduce partisan bias in elections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2011 marked a new low in American politics on two distinct
fronts. In Washington, D.C., hyper-partisanship and congressional gridlock led
to one of the least productive and most intransigent legislative sessions in recent
history 2-a year riddled with high-stakes showdowns on everything from
appropriations and debt-ceiling authorizations to short-term tax cuts and routine
agency-level appointments. 3 Meanwhile, in state capitals across the country,
legislators and redistricting commissions grappled with the decennial task of
21Ben Pershing, For Congress, Productivity Slides Downhill, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
2011, at A29.
3 For a small sampling of congressional gridlock, see Editorial, Chipping Away at
Gridlock: Senate Democrats Vote to Fight Back Against Endless Republican Delaying
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A26; David Nakamura & Ylan Q. Mui, Obama Blasts
GOP Filibuster of Consumer Agency Choice, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at AI; Jennifer
Steinhauer, Brinkmanship Again at Fore in the Capitol: Parties Agree on Goal, but Not Path
to It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, at Al.
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redrawing congressional district boundaries.4 The results were equally vitriolic
and dysfunctional.
In Ohio, a Republican congressional gerrymander sparked threats of a
referendum and the specter of two separate primary elections which would have
cost the state an additional fifteen million dollars. 5 Crisis was averted after four
months of legislative wrangling and a last minute, face-saving compromise for
both sides.6 In Arizona, the Governor called the state senate into special session
and took the unprecedented step of impeaching the chairwoman of the state's
Independent Redistricting Commission after the Commission--created by
citizen initiative just eleven years earlier to remove politics from the process-
submitted its proposed congressional map. 7 The Arizona Supreme Court averted
a constitutional crisis and restored the chairwoman to her post a mere three
hours after entertaining arguments. 8 Other states, including Texas and New
York, fared no better, dumping case after case into the laps of federal and state
courts to adjudicate on compressed, election-driven time frames.9
This Note proceeds with the assumption that reforming the latter problem of
congressional redistricting and the ever-present partisan gerrymander will
simultaneously help address the former problems of hyper-partisanship and
gridlock within the federal government. 10 Districts drawn with the express
purpose of favoring one political party (or incumbent legislator) naturally lead
to uncompetitive and uncontested general elections, putting a greater emphasis
on the primary election, which will determine the favored party's nominee.11
4 Jennifer Steinhauer, For Republicans, Redistricting Offers Few Gains, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2011, at A22.
5 Aaron Marshall, No Redistricting Deal Yet, but Talks Are Continuing, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 17, 2011, at B2.
6 Editorial, A Redistricting Post-Mortem, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 18, 2011, at
G2.
7 Mary Jo Pitzl, Redistricting Chief Ousted: Legal Battle Looms over Redrawing of
Political Maps, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2,2011, at Al.
8 Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1278 (Ariz. 2012);
Mary Jo Pitzl, Redistrict Chief Reinstated: Arizona Supreme Court Reverses Brewer's
Removal of Mathis, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 2011, at A 1.
9 See Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (showing that redistricting
litigants filed 194 separate actions as a result of the 2010 redistricting cycle); see also
Manny Fernandez, New Delay Is Possible for Primary in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012,
at A22; Thomas Kaplan, Group Sues over Albany Redistricting, Saying '12 Elections Are in
Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at A16.
OSee Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 513, 520 (2011); cf SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1 (3d ed. 2007) ("[I]nstitutional
arrangements ... influence the range of possible outcomes that formal elections and
subsequent policymaking can achieve.").
1 1 DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICEs/NEW VOICES: How PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 57-63 (2d ed.
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This reduces the universe of voters who ultimately determine who goes to
Congress and who stays home-a significant problem if the government is to
truly be "by the people."' 12 Worse yet, this process forces candidates toward the
ideological fringes in order to survive primary elections. 13
It seems axiomatic that drawing politically extreme congressional districts
will result in politically extreme candidates and, ultimately, politically extreme
members of Congress. 14 Compound the process 435 times and add in highly
sophisticated geographical information systems, and the stage is set for the
partisan recalcitrance that pervades Washington, D.C. and prevents action on
our nation's pressing problems. 15
We need a better method of drawing congressional districts. For decades,
disenfranchised voters, good-government activists, and political parties out of
power have turned to the courts for redress from partisan gerrymandering. 16
Despite a partial victory in the 1980s, when the Supreme Court first declared
that partisan gerrymanders could amount to unconstitutional discrimination, 17
reform advocates have made little headway with the Judiciary. The Supreme
Court backtracked throughout the past decade when it declared there are no
judicially discernible and manageable standards for evaluating partisan
2002); see also Seth C. McKee et al., The Partisan Impact of Congressional Redistricting:
The Case of Texas, 2001-2003, 87 SoC. Sci. Q. 308, 316 (2006).12 Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable
Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
243, 244 (2009) ("A group that is denied by partisan gerrymandering the effective exercise
of its vote is necessarily deprived of the ability to protect its rights.").
13See David M. Konisky & Michiko Ueda, The Effects of Uncontested Elections on
Legislator Performance, 36 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 199,204 (2011).
14 See JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS: How PARTISANSHIP Is POISONING THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 89-114 (2006); Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The
Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 415,427-31 (2004). But
see Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI.
666,678-79(2009).
15 This Note does not pretend that partisan gerrymandering is the only, or even the
leading, cause of congressional gridlock. Partisan gerrymandering is but one of many
factors. See Jeffrey W. Ladewig, Ideological Polarization and the Vanishing of Marginals:
Retrospective Roll-Call Voting in the US. Congress, 72 J. POL. 499, 499 (2010). Eliminating
political polarization and gridlock, however, are not the only benefits, nor the only aims, of
redistricting reform.
16 See Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn
Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1131, 1131 (2005) ("[P]laintiffs routinely turn to
the courts, not only to strike down plans as illegal, but also to draw remedial plans to take
their place."). See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the
Line?: Judicial Review of Partisan Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2004) (analyzing
partisan gerrymandering lawsuits throughout the past thirty years).17 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1986).
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gerrymander claims, 18 and states have responded imperviously to the threat of
judicial sanction in the years since. 19
Given the Supreme Court's acquiescence to partisan gerrymandering,
meaningful reform must come from the ground up, through changes to state
constitutions and the processes they establish for redistricting. Several states,
including Arizona,20 California,21 and Washington,22 have succeeded in
reforming their redistricting procedures to limit partisan gerrymanders. Others,
like Ohio, have tried and come up short, but are poised to try again.23 Before
they do, policymakers and the voters who must ultimately approve any reforms
deserve a better understanding of the various redistricting procedures available
as well as the effects those procedures have on electoral outcomes. This Note
serves that objective by providing an unbiased, empirical analysis of the three
most prevalent redistricting processes currently in use.
As upset voters and election reform advocates increasingly turn their
attention toward redistricting reforms, this Note argues that constitutional
advances should be made in the processes states use when selecting mapmakers
and district maps. Specifically, this Note urges states to adopt nonpartisan
redistricting commissions consisting of legislative service agency staff members
and recommends that those commissions use an open-submission process when
creating new congressional maps. Part II of this Note argues that the Supreme
Court's muddled, unenforced jurisprudence on partisan gerrymandering
necessarily leaves state constitutional reforms as the only viable resolution to
blatant partisan gerrymandering. Part III provides an empirical analysis of the
effects on electoral responsiveness and partisan bias under the three most
prevalent redistricting processes-partisan redistricting, bipartisan redistricting,
and nonpartisan redistricting-and shows that nonpartisan redistricting
commissions are best suited to reduce partisan gerrymandering. Part IV then
proposes a roadmap for reforms that states can utilize as they amend their
procedures for drawing congressional districts. Adopting these proposals will
help restore fairness and confidence in the redistricting process and ultimately
lead to less rancor and partisan extremism in Congress.
18 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409-10 (2006); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion).
19See infra Part II.C (discussing recent partisan gerrymanders in Illinois, Maryland,
and Ohio).20 Aiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; About IRC, ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION, http://www.azredistricting.org/About-IRC/default.asp (last visited Feb. 20,
2012).
21 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, §§ 1-3; Seema Mehta, The Redrawing Process at a Glance,
L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2011, at A15.
2 2 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; Historical Timeline, WASH. ST. REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION, http://www.redistricting.wa.gov/history.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
23 Jim Siegel & Joe Hallett, Redistricting Plan Expected to Be on Ballot, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, July 3, 2012, at A l (summarizing a voter initiative to take redistricting out of the
hands of the state legislature and vest it with an independent citizens' commission).
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II. FAILED JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
In the wake of the "Reapportionment Revolution" 24 of the 1960s, voters fed
up with the harmful effects of partisan gerrymandering continued to look to
federal courts as their primary avenue for redress. Encouraged by the successes
of early redistricting cases, which established the "one-person, one-vote"
principle, litigants soon "shifted from seeking quantitative equality, in the form
of equal representation, to seeking qualitative equality, or fair representation." 25
This goal has proven elusive. Although voters achieved a partial victory in
Davis v. Bandemer, when the Supreme Court held that claims of purely partisan
gerrymandering were justiciable,26 the Court's exceedingly high standard for
prevailing on a claim of discriminatory vote dilution has proven unattainable for
litigants.27 Subsequent rulings have further undercut the initial promise from
Bandemer and have left the Judiciary wholly ineffective as a deterrent or
remedy to partisan gerrymandering.28 As a result of these failed judicial
responses, state-based constitutional reforms remain the only credible check
against harmful partisan gerrymanders.
A. Establishing Justiciability: The Bandemer Standard
In Davis v. Bandemer, the seminal case on partisan gerrymandering, the
Supreme Court for the first time declared that claims of purely partisan
gerrymandering were justiciable and could amount to unconstitutional
discrimination through vote dilution.29 Six Justices agreed that Indiana voters
could bring an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a Republican gerrymander
2 4 J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 543, 545-46 (2011)
(discussing landmark Supreme Court cases like Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192-94, 198,
209, 237 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566-68 (1964), that established the
justiciability and framework of constitutional challenges to redistricting plans).2 5 Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 24, at 546.
2 6 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (plurality opinion).
2 7 See infra Part II.B (examining post-Bandemer litigation and finding that courts have
not struck down a single redistricting plan on solely partisan gerrymander claims).
2 8 See infra Part II.C (discussing increasingly egregious partisan gerrymanders in
response to judicial acquiescence).
2 9 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (plurality opinion). Prior justiciable
redistricting cases centered only on allegations of unequal district populations or racial
gerrymandering. Id. at 119 (majority opinion). Bandemer resulted in a flurry of opinions.
While six Justices agreed that the claim was justiciable, three Justices believed the claim was
a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 111-12 (syllabus). The case involved a district
court decision which held that Indiana's 1981 state legislative redistricting unconstitutionally
diluted the votes of Indiana Democrats through a peculiar mix of single-member and
multimember districts, irregularly shaped district lines, and district lines that failed to adhere
consistently to political subdivision boundaries. Id. at 116 (plurality opinion).
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of the state's legislative districts.30 A four-Justice plurality, however, delivered
the Court's controlling opinion and determined the voters had not demonstrated
unconstitutional discrimination sufficiently. 31 The plurality opinion sent the first
of many signals that the Judiciary is ill-suited to provide relief to voters
disenfranchised by partisan gerrymanders.
The Bandemer plurality established an exceedingly high yet murky standard
for proving unconstitutional political discrimination. Under this two-part test,
plaintiffs must prove "both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group." 32 The
plurality stated that due to the political nature of redistricting, discriminatory
intent would be an easily identifiable precursor so long as the plaintiffs could
prove discriminatory effects. 33 Proving discriminatory effects, however, would
be another matter. Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated that lack of
proportional political representation is not sufficient to prove unconstitutional
discrimination; rather, "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's
or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."34
The plurality reasoned that because voters who cast their ballots for a losing
candidate still have as much an opportunity to influence the winning candidate
as other voters in the district, no constitutional discrimination has occurred,
even in redistricting schemes where there was an intent to discriminate and the
losing group "loses election after election" in a safe district.35 In short, unless
the disenfranchised voters can prove that the candidate elected will "entirely
ignore" their interests, there is no discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. 36 Foreshadowing future legal battles, Justice Powell admonished the
plurality and called for a clearer, and presumably more attainable, standard for
proving unconstitutional political discrimination stemming from partisan
gerrymanders. 37
3 01d. at 125-27 (majority opinion).
3 1 Id. at 143 (plurality opinion).
3 2 1d. at 127.
33 1d. at 127-29.
34 1d. at 132 (emphasis added).
3 5 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion).
36 Id.
37Justices Powell and Stevens advanced an alternative formulation, centered on
whether the district boundaries have been "distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve
illegitimate ends." Id. at 165 (Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). This inquiry would have focused on independent measures of a
redistricting plan's fairness-factors like the configuration of the districts, whether districts
conformed to the lines of political subdivisions, and the nature of the legislative process by
which the redistricting plan was adopted. Id. at 173. Examining those factors, Justices
Powell and Stevens felt the Indiana plan was a "paradigm example" of unconstitutional
discrimination, and they would have affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Id. at 185.
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B. An Unworkable Standard: Backtracking from Bandemer
If Bandemer offered limited hope for voters seeking redress from the
discriminatory effects of partisan gerrymanders, subsequent rulings
demonstrated how elusive the promise of judicial relief truly is.38 Lower courts
have struggled to give consistent meaning to the Bandemer plurality's vague
articulation of the discriminatory-effects test since its inception.3 9 As noted
constitutional scholar Professor Laurence Tribe remarked, "Neither Justice
White's nor Justice Powell's approach to the question of partisan apportionment
gives any real guidance to lower courts forced to adjudicate this issue ....,40
Due to these inconsistent interpretations, as well as the high bar the Bandemer
standard established, the Judiciary has not struck down a single redistricting
plan on account of unconstitutional discrimination stemming solely from
partisan gerrymanders. 4 1
In 2001, the Supreme Court largely ignored Bandemer when it reversed a
successful equal protection challenge to a race-based gerrymander of the
Twelfth Congressional District of North Carolina, stating that judicial caution is
especially warranted where "political explanation[s]," rather than race, are the
predominant factor in a redistricting plan.42 The North Carolina gerrymander
38 McDonald, supra note 12, at 248; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:
Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 737 (1998) ("[I]n Davis v.
Bandemer, the Court announced a liability standard for partisan gerrymanders that was
essentially impossible to satisfy.").39 E.g., Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 957-58 (4th Cir. 1992)
(viewing the test narrowly and holding that because North Carolina Republicans were
historically inhibited from running for one office-superior court judge-there was
sufficient evidence of unconstitutional discrimination to withstand a motion for dismissal);
Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (analyzing Bandemer's
effect test under the rubric of racial vote dilution and requiring the political group to set forth
evidence of: (1) geographical compactness, (2) political cohesiveness of that group, (3) bloc
voting on the part of the majority group, and (4) that the totality of the circumstances
indicate vote dilution); Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1174-75 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
(viewing the test broadly and holding that because Texas had elected a Republican Governor
twice in the past fifteen years, Republican voters were not "unable to effectively influence
legislative outcomes" such that the state's legislative redistricting should be overturned);
Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (viewing the test broadly and
holding that Republican plaintiffs could not be "entirely ignored" in the political process
because California had a Republican Governor, one Republican U.S. Senator, and 40% of
California's congressional delegation was Republican), aft'd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).4 0 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1083 (2d ed. 1988).
41 Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 24, at 548. Although a federal district court struck
down North Carolina's method of electing superior court judges statewide rather than on a
district-by-district basis, a legislative solution ultimately rendered the case moot. Ragan v.
Vosburgh, Nos. 96-2621, 96-2687, 96-2739, 1997 WL 168292, at *1, *4-6 (4th Cir. Apr. 10,
1997).
42 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 257 (2001) (culminating nearly a decade of
litigation stemming from North Carolina Democrats' 1991 gerrymander of the state's
congressional districts).
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"created an unusually shaped district, split counties and cities, and in particular
placed almost all heavily Democratic-registered, predominantly African-
American voting precincts, inside the district."'43 Although Easley v. Cromartie
challenged North Carolina's gerrymander on account of racial discrimination as
opposed to political discrimination, the Supreme Court's reversal sent a strong
signal that "political behavior" was an acceptable explanation for the
gerrymandered district.44 Indeed, the Court did not even mention Bandemer or
so much as hint at constitutional limits to partisan gerrymandering. 4
5
Two follow-on Supreme Court cases which did discuss Bandemer at length
further undercut any promise for judicial relief by holding there are no
judicially discernible and manageable standards to evaluate partisan
gerrymandering claims. 46 Consequently, the Court upheld egregious partisan
gerrymanders in both Pennsylvania and Texas and, in the process, signaled a
green light for future partisan redistricting mischief.
Following the 2000 census, Pennsylvania Republicans enacted a partisan
congressional redistricting plan, allegedly at the behest of "[p]rominent national
figures in the Republican Party" to serve as a "punitive measure" for pro-
Democratic plans enacted elsewhere. 47 Despite Democrats outnumbering
Republicans in both registered and actual voters within the commonwealth, the
plan was designed to result in thirteen safe Republican seats out of nineteen
total districts. 48 Democratic voters challenged the gerrymander, and the district
court agreed that Republicans had enacted the plan in order to establish a
Republican supermajority among their congressional delegation.49
Nevertheless, because the congressional plan did not "essentially
shut[] ... Democratic voters out of the political process," the court dismissed
the political gertymander claim. 50 The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision, noting Bandemer's "inability to enunciate [a] judicially
4 3 1d. at 238.
44 See id. at 257. The Court explained its original decision to remand the case for
further proceedings, noting "there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
evidence also was consistent with a constitutional political objective, namely, the creation of
a safe Democratic seat." Id. at 239.4 5 McDonald, supra note 12, at 253.
4 6 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409-10 (2006)
(upholding Texas's mid-decade congressional gerrymander); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 305-06 (2004) (plurality opinion) (upholding Pennsylvania's 2002 congressional
gerrymander). For an excellent discussion of the Pennsylvania and Texas gerrymanders as
well as the subsequent court decisions, see McDonald, supra note 12, at 253-59.
47 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272 (plurality opinion).
4 8 Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
4 9 d. at 544.
50Id. at 547 (holding that because Democrats could still engage in fundamental
democratic actions like registering to vote, raising money on behalf of candidates, voting,
and speaking out on matters of public concern, they had failed to meet Bandemer's robust
test for "discriminatory effect").
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discernible and manageable standard" for partisan gerrymandering 5' and
sending yet another signal to partisan actors with an eye on the next redistricting
cycle.
While the Pennsylvania case was winding its way through the courts, Texas
Republicans, emboldened by winning control of the State House and Senate in
2002, bucked political norms and attempted to pass a largely unprecedented
mid-decade re-redistricting plan.52 Despite a protracted struggle, in which
dozens of Democratic legislators fled the state to deny a necessary quorum to
pass the plan, Republican legislators enacted a new congressional map in 2003,
"with the single-minded purpose ... to gain partisan advantage." 53 Democratic
voters challenged the map, arguing that a "mid-decennial redistricting, when
solely motivated by partisan objectives" is an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause.54 Despite acknowledging that
the sole purpose and effect of the mid-decade redistricting was to gain partisan
advantage in the Texas congressional delegation, 55 the Supreme Court again
denied relief to the voters and upheld the gerrymander.56 The Texas debacle and
accompanying court decisions sent the strongest message yet: partisan actors
need not fear judicial sanction of blatant political gerrymanders.
Thus, Bandemer's unworkable standard-announced by a plurality, applied
inconsistently by lower courts ever since, and largely ignored and undercut by
subsequent Supreme Court rulings-cannot be viewed as a credible deterrent or
remedy to partisan gerrymanders.
C. State Responses to Judicial Acquiescence: The Compelling Need for
Redistricting Reform
State responses in the wake of this judicial acquiescence further underscore
the compelling need for redistricting reform from the ground up, through
modifications to state constitutional provisions. A cursory look at the 2011-
51 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion).
52Adam Cox, Partisan Fairnesss and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751,
752-53 (2004).
53 Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
54 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
55 1d. at 412-13 ("The 2004 congressional elections did not disappoint the plan's
drafters. Republicans won 21 seats to the Democrats' 11 .... ").
56 See id. at 410 (judgment of the Court). Justice Kennedy, the swing Justice, rejected
the plaintiffs' equal protection claims based upon a "sole-intent" theory of political
discrimination, finding that despite the legislature's overarching political objectives,
"partisan aims did not guide every line it drew." Id. at 417-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy also rejected the plaintiffs' proposed standard
for showing "discriminatory effects" because it failed in its requirement to "show a burden,
as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants' representational rights." Id. at 418.
Without a breach of a recognized, manageable standard, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs'
partisan gerrymander claim. Id. at 423 (plurality opinion).
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2012 redistricting process in Illinois, Maryland, and Ohio reveals once more
that the threat of judicial sanction is an ineffective deterrent to partisan
gerrymandering. 57 Each of these states enacted overtly partisan gerrymanders in
the most recent redistricting cycle, seemingly impervious to the specter of
judicial rebuke. 58
Democrats in Illinois and Maryland raised eyebrows for their aggressive
gerrymanders. In Illinois, private memorandums between the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee and state legislative leadership offices
instructed that a "critical part of the remapping process is altering the districts of
incumbent Republicans to complicate their paths back to Washington." 59 The
new map in Illinois is expected to utterly transform an eleven-to-eight
Republican majority congressional delegation into a twelve-to-six Democratic
majority delegation. 60
In Maryland, Democratic legislators targeted incumbent Republican
Congressman Roscoe Bartlett by stretching his district nearly 200 miles from
the West Virginia border to the Washington, D.C. beltway, taking in hundreds
of thousands of new Democratic voters in the process. 61 Though a federal
district court dismissed a challenge to the redistricting plan, the court noted that
"Maryland's Republican Party regularly receives 40% of the statewide vote but
might well retain only 12.5% of the congressional seats." 62 One judge stated the
plan was, "by any reasonable standard, a blatant partisan gerrymander." 63
Ohio's recent gerrymander is also illustrative because it represents one of
the more brazen attempts in modem history to convert a toss-up state's
congressional boundaries into a supermajority delegation for one political party.
Pressured by home-state Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives John
Boehner, majority-party Republicans in the Ohio General Assembly crafted a
congressional redistricting map that would transform a state "split 50-50
politically" into a congressional delegation with "a Republican lock on 12 of the
state's proposed 16 congressional districts." 64 To accomplish this feat, the map
relied upon fifty-four county splits, with seven counties split three ways or
5 7 See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
58 See id.
59Rick Pearson, GOP: Memo Shows Dem Remap Had Political Aim, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
7, 2011, at 4.60 See id. The Illinois gerrymander represents one of the best pick-up opportunities for
Democrats nationwide. See id.
61 Aaron C. Davis, Judges Uphold Congressional Redistricting, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2011, at BI.62 Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 903-04 (D. Md. 2011) (upholding the
redistricting plan in part because plaintiffs failed to offer a reliable standard for adjudicating
their partisan gerrymandering claim).
63Id. at 905-07 (Titus, J., concurring) (criticizing the current state of the law with
regards to claims of political gerrymandering and arguing for a burden-shifting regime to
evaluate these claims).64 Editorial, Hyperpartisan Redistricting, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 14, 2011, at
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more. 65 The Ohio gerrymander scored worse than all fifty-three public
submissions in a 2011 citizen redistricting competition when scored on
objective criteria like compactness of districts, political competitiveness, and
preserving communities of interest.66  Moreover, using an "electoral
disproportionality" scale that compares established democracies around the
world, one political scientist calculated that "[t]he 450 members of Russia's
Duma are elected from districts that are fairer" and more competitive than
Ohio's new congressional districts. 67
As these examples show, the risk of judicial sanction has not dissuaded
legislators from enacting increasingly egregious partisan gerrymanders. If
anything, recent judicial acquiescence has encouraged states to adopt more
aggressive maps than they might have contemplated just twenty years ago. Past
redistricting litigation indicates disenfranchised voters will find little subsequent
redress in court. These failed judicial responses leave state-based constitutional
reforms as the only viable solution to the harmful effects of partisan
gerrymandering.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTISAN, BIPARTISAN, AND NONPARTISAN
REDISTRICTING
Despite partisan efforts to gerrymander districts for naked political
advantage, the normative value of any redistricting plan that is free from
gerrymandering lies in how responsive the system is to voter preferences and
how unbiased it is toward the political parties. The Supreme Court, legal
scholars, and political scientists have all identified obtaining responsive and
unbiased electoral systems as key aims in redistricting.68 This section explores
the effects that different redistricting processes have on levels of electoral
responsiveness and partisan bias, and empirically demonstrates that the
processes states utilize can have immediate, significant, and lasting impacts on
the substantive outcomes of their elections. This analysis shows that nonpartisan
redistricting is best suited to control partisan gerrymandering by simultaneously
increasing electoral responsiveness and reducing partisan bias.
65 Joe Hallett, Experts Slam New District Mapping: Group Hopes to Make Process Less
Political, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Dec. 22, 2011, at B 1.
6 6 1d. For a side-by-side comparison of the congressional map Republicans enacted
versus the winner of Ohio's citizen redistricting competition, see infra Appendix, fig.6.
67 Hallett, supra note 65.
68 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 52, at 754; Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing
Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 541, 554 (1994)
[hereinafter Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy]; Bernard Grofinan & Gary King, The
Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC
v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6-9 (2007). Although not every scholar agrees with the
assumptions that higher responsiveness and lower bias are normative goals of redistricting,
this Note proceeds as though they are, focusing on how to achieve those goals rather than
rearguing their importance.
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A. Electoral Responsiveness and Partisan Bias
Before describing the analysis and results, a better understanding of the
variables studied is required. Electoral responsiveness is the degree to which
changes in voter preferences are reflected in the partisan composition of the
winning candidates. 69 While scholars have come to an agreement on this
definition, they have not agreed upon how to best measure responsiveness. 70
Regardless of the measurement method selected, once a parameter for
electoral responsiveness is calculated, interpretations can be made about a
state's elections. There are three possible types of representation: proportional
representation, unresponsive representation, and majoritarian representation. 71
The simplest form is proportional representation, in which the parameter for
responsiveness equals "1."72 In proportional representation, a 1% increase in the
statewide vote share for a particular party will correspond with a 1% increase in
that party's share of legislative seats.73 Exact proportional representation is rare
in U.S. elections, 74  but some states do achieve near-proportional
representation. 75
To one side of proportional representation lies unresponsive
representation. 76 In an unresponsive electoral system, an increase of 1% in the
statewide vote share will lead to a smaller corresponding increase in seat share:
somewhere between 0% and 1%.77 Electoral systems in which changes in the
legislative seat share do not keep pace with changes in voter preferences seem
counter to American notions of representative democracy. 78
6 9 E.g., Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 542.7 0 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
71 A word of caution: the level or category of responsiveness is a distinct concept and
parameter from partisan bias. See Gary King, Representation Through Legislative
Redistricting: A Stochastic Model, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 787, 793 (1989). Proportional,
unresponsive, and majoritarian systems can all be equally fair to both parties in the
translation of votes to seats, provided there is no partisan bias. Id. at 789-93. Similarly,
proportional representation does not necessarily connote a lack of partisan bias. Id. Bias is
discussed later in Part 1I.A.72 Gary King & Robert X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in
Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1251, 12.54 (1987).
7 3 1d.
741d. at 1254-55. Proportional representation is common in many European
parliamentary elections, where the number of seats won by a particular party is directly
proportional to that party's vote share. AMY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
75 See infra Part III.D.3. From 1990-2010, Ohio, on average, achieved near-
proportional representation.
76 King & Browning, supra note 72, at 1254.
77 See id.
78 See Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 544 ("Scholars of
American politics almost uniformly take the normative position that higher values of
responsiveness indicate a healthier democracy."); see also Grofman & King, supra note 68,
at 9.
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To the other side of proportional representation lies majoritarian
representation, in which the parameter for responsiveness is greater than "1."79
Thus, for every 1% increase in the statewide vote share for a particular party,
the corresponding increase in legislative seat share will increase by some figure
greater than 1%.80 Majoritarian representation is common in modem U.S.
elections,8' and American political theorists consistently have held that a higher
level of responsiveness is a desirable political outcome. 82
As states contemplate reforming their redistricting processes, they should
consider the impact that a given procedure will have on electoral
responsiveness. Enacting a redistricting process that leads to higher
responsiveness will send a strong message to a state's electorate: your votes will
not merely be counted-they will matter in apportioning legislative control.
The second normative aspect of any redistricting plan is how fairly it treats
the political parties. Although partisan fairness can mean many things, the most
widely held understanding of political fairness is the lack of partisan bias within
a redistricting system. 83 Partisan bias, in turn, describes how fairly a given
redistricting plan treats the two political parties in the translation of statewide
vote share to seats awarded. 84 In a biased system, it is harder for one party to
translate its statewide vote share into seats.85 Contrast this with an unbiased
system, where both parties are required to attain the same percentage of the
statewide vote share to win a given percentage of seats. 86 For example, in an
unbiased system, if Democrats received 52% of the statewide vote and obtained
58% of the seats, then Republicans would also need only 52% of the vote to win
58% of the seats. The implication is that both parties would need only 50% of
the statewide vote share to obtain a majority of the seats in an unbiased system.
79 King & Browning, supra note 72, at 1255.80 1d.
S1 See Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 545.
82 1d. at 544; Grofman & King, supra note 68, at 9 ("Most scholars therefore regard
electoral systems with higher levels of electoral responsiveness as better[; ... many favor
the American system of district-based elections, since it tends to produce a higher level of
responsiveness than other systems."). See generally John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of
Competition in Congressional Elections, 71 AM. POL. Sct. REv. 166 (1977) (analyzing
possible sources for the lack of responsiveness and competition in modem congressional
elections). Using a different model than this Note, King and Browning highlight three
benefits of majoritarian representation: First, it facilitates governing because it encourages
majorities to form; second, it fosters partisan competition since a small increase in vote share
near the 50% vote mark will result in a much larger increase in seat share; third, majoritarian
representation actually protects minority political interests because after a party obtains 50%
of the vote, there are diminishing returns for each additional percentage of the overall vote
share. King & Browning, supra note 72, at 1255. Less clear is if there is an optimal or
excessive level of responsiveness.
8 3 Cox, supra note 52, at 764-65; Grofman & King, supra note 68, at 6-8.
84 King, supra note 71, at 789.85 Cox, supra note 52, at 765.
86 Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,
67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540, 542-43 (1973).
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Any deviation from this outcome becomes the parameter for partisan bias.87 For
example, if Democrats only needed 46% of the statewide vote share to win a
majority of seats, then the parameter for bias would equal 4% in favor of
Democrats.
Political gerrymandering, at its core, is the process of enshrining an
electoral system with partisan bias in favor of those who draw the districts,
thereby obtaining a decade-long electoral advantage, irrespective of voter
preferences. 88 Courts and scholars have consistently condemned these
gerrymanders and their harmful effects. 89 As states pursue redistricting reforms,
they should enact processes that lead to the reduction, if not the elimination, of
partisan bias.
B. Procedural Approaches to Redistricting: Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Iowa as Examples
There are dozens of possible variations in the redistricting procedures states
utilize, including legislatively drawn districts; commission-drawn districts;
hybrid procedures; or court-drawn districts. 90 All of these systems, however,
can be loosely classified by who controls the levers of power: one political party
(partisan redistricting); both parties (bipartisan redistricting); or neither party
(nonpartisan redistricting). This study analyzes those three redistricting
procedures at work in the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Iowa,
respectively. 91
87 1d. at 542.
88See Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 543 (discussing the
effects of redistricting on partisan bias and finding that "on average, redistricting favors the
party that draws the lines more than if the party were to draw the lines. In fact, the effect is
substantial and fades only very gradually over the following 10 years").
89 See e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123-27 (1986); Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593,601-11(2002).
9 0 JUSTIN LEvITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING
34-36 (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/dbda15l33afb14c05bi4m6b40of.pdf
[hereinafter CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING]. At least thirty states still assign primary
congressional redistricting power to their state legislatures. Id. The remaining states use a
mix of advisory commissions, backup commissions, independent commissions, or other
political commissions. Id.
91 The findings of this study are necessarily limited to the three states in question.
While an analysis of more states would have provided more generalizable results, such a
study was beyond the scope of this analysis. Moreover, only one state (Iowa) utilized a
nonpartisan redistricting procedure for a long enough time frame to provide meaningful
results, so it seemed intuitive to focus on one state from each category of redistricting
procedures. Ohio and Pennsylvania were selected because they are both heavily populated
swing states with a broad mixture of rural, urban, suburban, and exurban areas. Although
Iowa is not as heavily populated and is predominately rural, its politics are closely divided,
and it was the only state with a nonpartisan redistricting institution in operation throughout
the time period of this study.
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While the focus of this Note is congressional gerrymanders, the empirical
analysis of different redistricting procedures necessarily centers on state
legislative redistricting for two reasons: (1) state legislative elections produce
more data points than congressional races;92 and (2) these states' redistricting
processes can be classified clearly as partisan, bipartisan, and nonpartisan. 93
Nevertheless, the approach taken and results gleaned can be transferred easily to
any two-party races, including congressional elections. 94
1. Partisan Redistricting-Ohio
Ohio uses a partisan system to draw its state legislative districts: the five-
member Apportionment Board consists of the Governor, the auditor of state, the
secretary of state, and one legislator from each political party.95 Since the first
three members are statewide elected officials, the Apportionment Board will
always have a partisan majority. 96 A simple majority vote of the Apportionment
Board is required to enact a redistricting proposal.97 This Note, which analyzes
elections from 1990-2010, involves one election conducted under a Democratic
map (the 1990 election, which was the last held under the map Democrats
crafted in 1981). The remaining ten elections were conducted under maps
drawn by Republican-controlled apportionment boards in 1991 and 2001.
92 Ohio has 99 state house districts compared to 16 congressional seats; Pennsylvania
has 203 state house districts compared to 18 congressional seats; Iowa has 100 state house
districts compared to just 4 congressional seats. Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines? Party
Control-Congressional Lines, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who
partyfed.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (offering a comparison of the number of legislative
districts and congressional seats). For the proposition that more data leads to more reliable
findings, see Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 542-43.
9 3 See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text. Had the study focused on
congressional races, the analysis would be muddled because in Ohio and Pennsylvania, the
legislatures are in charge of congressional redistricting rather than their partisan and
bipartisan commissions for state legislative races. Levitt, supra note 92 (offering a state-by-
state comparison of congressional redistricting institutions).
9 4 See generally Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68 (analyzing
state legislative races to draw general inferences about the effects of redistricting on
responsiveness and bias); Richard G. Niemi & Simon Jackman, Bias and Responsiveness in
State Legislative Districting, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 183 (1991) (analyzing state legislative races
and reaching results consistent with recent findings in congressional races for the effects of
redistricting on responsiveness and bias).
95 OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1.96 Since the Ohio Apportionment Board's enactment in 1967, Democrats controlled the
process in 1971 and 1981, while Republicans controlled the process in 1991, 2001, and
again in 2011. Thomas Suddes, Dreaming up Districts Has Been GOP's Hobby, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), July 8, 2012, at GI.
97 OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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2. Bipartisan Redistricting-Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania uses a bipartisan redistricting process. The five-member
Legislative Reapportionment Commission consists of two Democrats and two
Republicans: the majority and minority leaders from the State House and Senate
or their delegates. 98 Those four members must then agree upon a fifth member,
the chairperson, who may not be a paid local, state, or federal employee.99 If the
four legislators cannot agree upon a chairperson, then the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court must appoint one. 100 A simple majority vote of the
Reapportionment Commission is required to enact a redistricting plan.1 1
In the five redistricting cycles that Pennsylvania has used this process,
commission members have deadlocked four times on choosing a chairperson-
throwing the decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 10 2 Because Justices
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are elected on a partisan basis, 103 partisan
motives might play a factor when members deadlock on choosing a chair.
Nevertheless, the court has painstakingly avoided playing a partisan role when
appointing the chairperson. 10 4 Due to the compromise commission members
face in selecting their chairperson, as well as the even-handed approach the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has taken when commission members have
98 PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(b).
991d.
1001d.
101Id. § 17(a).
102 Tom Barnes, Lawmakers Can't Agree on Chairman for Redistricting Pane!,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE.COM (Apr. 4, 2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/breaking/lawmakers-cant-agree-on-chairman-for-redistricting-
panel-291930/. The Commission deadlocked in 1971, 1991, 2001, and again in 2011.
Legislators were only successful in choosing their own chairperson in 1981. Id.
103 PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a).
104 In 1971, a Republican court appointed a law professor and registered Democrat to
head the commission. Janelle Hobbs, Reapportionment in Pennsylvania: A History of the
Reapportionment Process and the Legislative Reapportionment Commission 24 (1981)
(unpublished thesis, Claremont Men's College) (on file with Claremont McKenna College
Library System), available at http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm/compoundobject/
collection/ric/id/10763/rec/3. In 1991, the court appointed a former federal prosecutor,
highly respected by Democrats and Republicans alike, and the resulting plan gained the
support of commission members from both parties. See Russell E. Eshleman Jr., City Would
Lose, Suburbs Gain in Pa. Redistricting, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 26, 1991, at 1-B. In 2001, a
Democratic court appointed a retired Republican Supreme Court Justice, and commission
members approved the resulting maps unanimously. Thomas Fitzgerald, Judge to Lead
Committee on Redistricting, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 9, 2001, at B 1; see also Albert v. 2001
Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 790 A.2d 989, 992 (Pa. 2002). In 2011, a Republican
court appointed an emeritus Superior Court Judge who is respected by leaders of both
political parties. James O'Toole & Timothy McNulty, Judge Heads Pa. Remapping
Delegation: Republican to Look at Legislative Districts, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr.
20, 2011, at B1.
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deadlocked on choosing a chair, Pennsylvania redistricting is best characterized
as a bipartisan procedure.
3. Nonpartisan Redistricting-Iowa
Iowa utilizes a unique nonpartisan redistricting procedure. The process
originates with the nonpartisan Legislative Services Agency, which crafts a
redistricting plan based solely upon objective districting criteria. 10 5 The
legislature and Governor must then pass the proposed plan, without
amendment, 10 6 or else the agency will introduce its first alternative plan, also
not subject to legislative amendment. 10 7 If the alternate plan also fails, then the
agency will propose a third and final plan.108 The agency's third plan is subject
to amendment, 10 9 but if the legislature and Governor fail to enact a redistricting
plan by the fifteenth of September of the year following the federal census, then
the Iowa Supreme Court assumes responsibility for the state's redistricting.110
In the three redistricting cycles since this system's enactment, the legislature
and Governor have always approved a Legislative Service Agency plan, in part
because legislators are wary of going against the nonpartisan process, which has
obtained broad-based, popular support among Iowa voters. 11 '
C. The Analysis: Harnessing Data to Improve Our Politics
Policymakers and voters pursuing redistricting reforms should proceed on
an informed basis. Swapping one redistricting procedure for another without
first understanding the substantive outcomes that accompany the new procedure
can undercut well-intentioned reform efforts. For example, by switching from
partisan redistricting to a bipartisan system, reformers might unwittingly trade
one host of evils (partisan gerrymanders) for another (incumbent-protection
gerrymanders). The following analysis seeks to prevent this unfortunate
outcome by providing thorough, accurate, and unbiased information regarding
the three most prevalent redistricting procedures and their substantive impact on
elections.
105 IOWA CODE §§ 42.2, 42.4 (2011). The Legislative Services Agency crafts a map
based upon population, contiguity, compactness, and preservation of political subdivisions.
Id. § 42.4(1)-(4). No other information-including voter registration, past election results,
addresses of incumbents, or demographic information other than population counts-may be
considered. Id. § 42.4(5).
106 1d. § 42.3. Technical amendments are permitted; substantive amendments are not. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
'
0 9 Id.
110 IOWA CONST. art. Il, § 35.
111 See Ed Cook, A Nonpartisan Approach to Redistricting, LEGIS. LAW., Winter 2002,
at 1,3.
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1. The Data: State House Elections in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Iowa
from 1990-2010
This analysis covers every race for the lower houses of the legislatures of
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Iowa for the eleven general elections held from 1990-
2010.112 These states held a total of 4,422 district-level elections between 1990
and 2010. This time-series study includes analysis of two complete redistricting
cycles. Data were collected from the Ohio Secretary of State's office; 113 the
Pennsylvania Department of State;114 and the Iowa Secretary of State's
office. 115
All elections were held in single-member districts. Because the primary
focus of this study is the translation of statewide vote share to legislative seat
share between the two major parties, the analysis excludes third-party and
independent candidates and their vote totals. 116 Democrats or Republicans won
every election with the exception of Ohio House District Eight in 1994.117
112 The analysis also covers a special election for Iowa House District Fifty-Two, held
on December 12, 2006, to fill a vacancy caused by the death of an unopposed, incumbent
representative prior to the general election. See Charlotte Eby, State Rep. Freeman Dies at
64, GLOBE GAZETTE (Mason City, Iowa), Sept. 7, 2006, at A7; Jeff Jones, Demos Field 21-
Year-Old BV Student in Bid for Freeman's House Seat, PILOT TRIB. (Storm Lake, Iowa),
Nov. 14, 2006, at IA.
113 Ohio election results from 1998-2010 are available online. OHIO SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/elections/Research/electResultsMain.aspx (last visited Oct. 18,
2011). Election results from 1990-1998 were provided in electronic media upon request.
l 14 pennsylvania election results from 2000-2010 arc availablc online. PA. DEP'T OF
STATE, http://www.electionretums.state.pa.us/Electionslnformation.aspx?FunctionlD=O (last
visited Oct. 18, 2011). Election results from 1990-2000 were provided in electronic media
upon request.
115 Iowa election results from 1990-2010 are available online. IOWA SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/results/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
1 6Richard Niemi and Patrick Fett discussed some of the challenges associated with
coding and analyzing election data-particularly with regard to uncontested elections, cross-
party endorsements, and minor party candidates-and concluded it is not clear how to treat
these events. Richard G. Niemi & Patrick Fett, The Swing Ratio: An Explanation and an
Assessment, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 87 (1986). More recent redistricting research, however,
has ex~uded third-party and independent candidate vote totals from measurements of
electoral responsiveness and partisan bias. See Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy,
supra note 68, at 544; Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Estimating the Electoral
Consequences of Legislative Redistricting, 85 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 274, 274-75 (1990)
[hereinafter Gelman & King, Estimating the Electoral Consequences].
117 political Composition of the Ohio General Assembly-1990 to 2006, GONGWER
NEWS SERVICE INC., http://www.gongwer-oh.com/public/gahis.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2012). In that contest, C.J. Prentiss, an incumbent Democrat, won reelection as an
independent due to questions about her nominating petitions. Id. at n.7. Because she
continued to caucus with the Democratic Party, id., her 1994 independent vote total served
as the proxy vote for the Democratic Party in that election, and the official Democratic
candidate's vote totals were excluded.
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One area of concern with the data was how to account for uncontested
elections since they might not adequately reflect support for the two political
parties. While past redistricting research has not produced a consistent treatment
for uncontested elections,' 18 this analysis included vote totals from all
uncontested elections primarily because the methodology utilized, the
hypothetical one-year swing ratio, is much less dependent on how uncontested
elections are treated than are other quantitative methods.1 19 Under this
methodology, including uncontested elections has no impact on the measure of
electoral responsiveness, though it will affect the parameter for partisan bias if
either party were to win a disproportionate number of seats due to their vote
share in uncontested elections. 120
2. Methodology: The Hypothetical One- Year Swing Ratio
This analysis uses a modified version of a linear fit model to depict
electoral responsiveness and partisan bias. This modified version, the
"hypothetical one-year swing ratio," was first described by David Butler in
1951 in an analysis of British parliamentary elections.' 2' Subsequent
researchers have used this method (or variations of it) in examining the
relationship between vote share and seats won in legislative races throughout
the United States. 122 The hypothetical one-year swing ratio is an ordinary, least
squares linear regression of a series of possible data points, centered on the
actual result in a given election year. The first point constructed is the actual
result for a given election year. 123 The percentage of statewide votes that
Democratic candidates received is plotted on the x-axis, and the percentage of
the legislative seats Democrats won is plotted on the y-axis. 124 The other ten
118 Several authors omitted how they reported uncontested elections. See generally
King, supra note 71; Tufte, supra note 86. Others were more explicit. In their 1990 study of
state legislative redistricting, Gelman and King used a proxy or "effective" vote measure for
uncontested races. See Gelman & King, Estimating the Electoral Consequences, supra note
116, at 275. Other scholars, however, chose to include uncontested elections in the
calculation of both vote share and seat share when those figures were available. See, e.g.,
King & Browning, supra note 72, at 1260; Niemi & Jackman, supra note 94, at 200 n.4.119 Niemi & Fett, supra note 116, at 83.
120 See id Future research utilizing the hypothetical one-year swing ratio could'analyze
election results using a proxy "effective vote" discussed in supra note 118.
121 D.E. Butler, Appendix to H.G. NICHOLAS, THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1950,
at 306, 327-33 (1951).122 See Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POLITICS 1242, 1247-48 (1990); Niemi & Fett, supra note
116, at 80-84; Tufte, supra note 86, at 549-50; Paul Del Piero, A Statistical Evaluation and
Analysis of Legislative and Congressional Redistricting in California: 1974-2004, at 4-5
(2005) (unpublished student work, Pomona College), available at http://www.stat.columbia.
edu/-gelman/stuff for blog/piero.pdf.
12 3 Niemi & Fett, supra note 116, at 80.
1241M. at 81 fig.2.
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data points are created assuming the Democratic Party gained or lost votes
uniformly across all districts. 125 An example will illustrate:
In the 1990 Ohio elections, Democratic house candidates received 53.44%
of the statewide vote share and won 61.60% of the seats in that chamber. This
marks the first point for the regression analysis: 53.44% on the x-axis for vote
share, and 61.60% on the y-axis for seat share. Had Democrats fared better by
1% in every district (a uniform, statewide shift in voter preference), they would
not have won any additional seats. Therefore, the second point for the
regression analysis would be 54.44% on the x-axis, but an identical 61.60% on
the y-axis. But had Democrats won 2% more votes in every district, Democrats
would have won an additional two seats (a 2% increase). Consequently, the
third data point for the regression analysis would be 55.44% on the x-axis, and
63.60% on the y-axis. This process is repeated for ± 5% of the actual election
outcome. Regressing the dependent variable (seat share) against the
independent variable (vote share) for these eleven data points produces a
hypothetical one-year swing ratio. The results are plotted below in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Plot of Percentage Seats Won by Percentage Votes Won, Ohio House
of Representatives, 1990 General Election
0.65
0.64
X 0.63
S0.62
0.61
O
.0.6
0.59
0.58
0.8 0.5 0.52 0.54
Democratic Vote Share
0.56 0.58 0.6
a Linear Regression
The regression calculation includes estimated parameters for electoral
responsiveness and partisan bias. 12 6 In the 1990 Ohio example, the slope of the
125Id. at 80.
0.57
0.46
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regression line represents the level of responsiveness for that election-in this
case, 0.71. This indicates that for every 1% increase in statewide vote share for
the Democratic Party, an increase of 0.71% in Democratic seat share was
expected, marking a relatively unresponsive electoral system. The hypothetical
one-year swing ratio also enables calculations for partisan bias. 127 In an
unbiased system, both parties require the same percentage of statewide vote
share to achieve a majority in the legislature. By setting the percentage of seats
won at 50% and solving the equation for the percentage of the statewide vote
share, the result is the share of the vote that a political party is required to win in
order to obtain a majority. 128 The difference between this number and 50% is
the resultant partisan bias or built-in unfairness advantage that one party has
over another in a given electoral system. 129 In the example from Ohio in 1990,
the regression formula was:
Democratic Seat Share = 0.24 + (0.71 * Democratic Vote Share)
By setting "Democratic Seat Share" equal to 0.50 and solving the equation,
"Democratic Vote Share" equals 0.37. This indicates that the Democratic Party
needed just 37% of the statewide vote share to attain a majority of the
legislative seats in Ohio in 1990. Conversely, the Republican Party would have
needed 63% of the statewide vote share to achieve majority status. The
difference between the 37% required for Democrats to attain majority status and
the 50% that marks a truly unbiased system represents the parameter for
partisan bias. In this example, Democrats enjoyed a bias of 13% in the 1990
election. 130 Regardless of voter preferences, Democrats were able to translate
their statewide vote share into their share of legislative seats 13% more
effectively than Republicans.
The purpose of this Note is not to add to the growing literature on which
methodology is best for studying electoral responsiveness and partisan bias.
That no singular quantitative method has emerged with a consensus among
political scientists-let alone the courts-suggests that different approaches
provide different advantages and drawbacks. 131 This Note utilizes the
126 Tufte, supra note 86, at 543.
12 7 See id. at 548.
128 1d. at 542.
1291d.
130 This result is not surprising given that Democrats controlled the Apportionment
Board in the previous two redistricting cycles and instituted partisan gerrymanders to favor
their candidates. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 514, 545 (1994) [hereinafter Gelman &
King, Unified Method].
131 For a rigorous discussion on various methodologies, compare Gelman & King,
Unified Method, supra note 130, at 517-26 (expanding on an earlier stochastic model to
include prospective, theoretical predictions of responsiveness and bias), and King, supra
note 71, at 796-811 (introducing a probabilistic, stochastic model), with Niemi & Fett, supra
note 116, at 76-83 (discussing various versions of the linear fit model, including the
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hypothetical one-year swing ratio because it provides estimates for electoral
responsiveness and partisan bias in such a straightforward manner. This model
is more accessible to legislators, public interest groups, and concerned
citizens-the Note's intended audience-than are the complex algorithmic
formulas associated with other models. 132 Moreover, under the hypothetical
one-year swing ratio, the estimates for responsiveness and bias can be
calculated for single election years. 133 Other methodologies require data from
multiple elections and provide parameters for responsiveness and bias across a
range of years but do not provide estimates for particular elections. 134 While
knowing the values of responsiveness and bias over longer periods of time has
its own benefits, 135 the advantage of the hypothetical one-year swing ratio is
that it allows for discrete comparisons before and after particular redistricting
plans take effect.136 These before-and-after values offer keener insight into the
impact of redistricting itself.
D. The Results: Nonpartisan Redistricting Processes Lead to Optimal
Outcomes
The results 137 of this analysis show that the levels of electoral
responsiveness and partisan bias varied systematically across the three
redistricting processes utilized. Iowa, which utilizes a nonpartisan redistricting
process, experienced the highest levels of responsiveness and the near
elimination of partisan bias-the best outcome of the three redistricting
processes studied. Pennsylvania, which utilizes a bipartisan redistricting
process, experienced the lowest levels of responsiveness but also achieved near
elimination of partisan bias. Ohio, which utilizes a partisan redistricting process,
experienced near proportional representation but had the highest overall levels
of partisan bias. The results are plotted below in Figures 2-5.138
hypothetical one-year swing ratio), and Tufte, supra note 86, at 542-47 (discussing the linear
fit model, the cube law, and the logit model).132 See Robert X. Browning & Gary King, Seats, Votes, and Gerrymandering:
Estimating Representation and Bias in State Legislative Redistricting, 9 LAW & POL'Y 305,
313 (1987); see also Tufte, supra note 86, at 547.
133 See Niemi & Fett, supra note 116, at 82-83.
134 See Browning & King, supra note 132, at 305, 31 7; Niemi & Fett, supra note 116, at
78. 135 See Browning & King, supra note 132, at 309-10.
136 See Niemi & Fett, supra note 116, at 82.
137 For a table listing the complete results of this analysis, see infra Appendix, tbl.l.
Spreadsheets containing the raw data (election results from 1990-2010) were compiled in
accordance with supra Part III.C. 1 and are on file with the author.
138 Electoral responsiveness is plotted along the x-axis between values of"0" and "3." A
value of "1" indicates proportional representation. States with majoritarian representation
will have elections clustered around the right-hand side of the graph, with responsiveness
levels greater than "1" States with unresponsive representation will have elections clustered
around the left-hand side of the graph, with levels lower than "1." Partisan bias is plotted
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1. Nonpartisan Redistricting
Figure 2: Iowa House, 1990-2010
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Iowa, with its nonpartisan redistricting, had the highest levels of
responsiveness, with an average of "1.60." This means that for every 1% change
in statewide vote share, the seat share in the Iowa House changed, on average,
by 1.60%. Iowa experienced majoritarian representation in every election
except 2006, an apparent outlier. A majority of Iowa elections had
responsiveness greater than "1.5," indicating a relatively responsive electoral
system. More importantly, levels of responsiveness increased in the elections
immediately following both redistricting cycles; the two highest levels of
responsiveness in Iowa occurred in those elections (1992 and 2002).
These results, while based only on one state's experience, strongly suggest
that district maps created by nonpartisan officials will lead to greater
responsiveness to voter preferences. Because nonpartisan mapmakers will
presumably forego political considerations in favor of other districting
principles like population equality, compactness of districts, or preservation of
political subdivisions and communities of interest, individual districts are
along the y-axis, with values ranging from "-0.25" through "0.25." Positive percentages
indicate Democratic bias and negative percentages indicate Republican bias. For example, a
bias level of "-0.10" indicates that in that election, the Republican Party had an inherent 10%
advantage and would need to attain only 40% of the statewide vote share to achieve majority
status. States with high levels of bias will have elections clustered around the top or bottom
of the graph. States with low levels of bias will have elections clustered around the center,
horizontal axis (the y=0 line). Redistricting elections are plotted with filled squares. All
other elections are plotted with open squares.
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crafted to neither benefit a particular legislator's reelection prospects nor a
political party's overall election success. 139 This, in turn, leads to districts and
elections with greater levels of political uncertainty, and hence, increased
responsiveness to changes in voter preferences. Nonpartisan redistricting, which
in this study increased the responsiveness of a given electoral system, is an
effective way of ensuring that voter preferences determine the partisan makeup
of a state's congressional delegation-not the once-a-decade redistricting
process.
Nonpartisan Iowa also experienced the near elimination of partisan bias.
For the eleven elections studied, the average bias was just 0.2% in favor of
Democrats. Moreover, Iowa's low levels of bias were neatly clustered around
the y-0 line (as opposed to large levels of bias in either direction that merely
cancel each other out when averaged), with bias never exceeding 5% in favor of
either party. Both the 1991 and 2001 redistricting plans effectively eliminated
partisan bias from Iowa's electoral system. In addition, the three elections in
which bias exceeded 3% all occurred during the last or second-to-last election
held under a particular map, when the effects of redistricting are the most
remote. 140
These results suggest that removing the redistricting process from those
who stand to benefit politically from the outcome will lead to near-political
parity for both parties in the overall electoral system. 14 1 Under nonpartisan
redistricting, Democrats and Republicans will be treated equally in the
translation of vote share to seat share and will require nearly identical
percentages of the statewide vote share to achieve a majority of legislative seats.
Iowa's results are plotted above in Figure 2.
139 See King, supra note 71, at 817.140 See Cox, supra note 52, at 772.
141 See King, supra note 71, at 817-18.
2012]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
2. Bipartisan Redistricting
Figure 3: Pennsylvania House, 1990-2010
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Pennsylvania, with bipartisan redistricting, experienced the lowest levels of
electoral responsiveness, with an average of just "0.68"-indicating
unresponsive representation. Only two elections had levels of responsiveness
greater than "1." Redistricting itself led to mixed results. Following the 1991
redistricting, responsiveness decreased from "1.34" to "1 ." Following the 2001
redistricting, however, responsiveness increased slightly from "0.54" to "0.55."
These results, while again based only upon one state's experience, suggest
that bipartisan redistricting will lead to the lowest levels of electoral
responsiveness. Because enactment of any map requires consent from both
political parties, a common result is an incumbent-protection redistricting plan
in which both parties agree to leave the current districts largely unchanged. 142
This political stability in district lines in turn leads to low levels of
142 See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Reapportioning Election Districts. An Exercise in Political
Self-Preservation, USA TODAY MAG., Jan. 1997, at 22-23. Professor Ken Gormley, who
served as the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment
Commission during the 1991 redistricting cycle, flatly stated:
Preservation of jobs is the most powerful driving force behind reapportionment,
even more so than political rivalries or personal hatreds. The fact is, Democrats and
Republicans rally 'round the common goal of preserving each others' political necks
first. ...
Incumbency is more important than what voters want. It is more important than
what the Constitution says. It even trumps the natural urge to beat up the other political
party.
Id. at22.
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responsiveness, 143 so that large shifts in statewide vote share are required to
achieve any meaningful, corresponding shift in the apportionment of legislative
seats.
Bipartisan Pennsylvania-like nonpartisan Iowa-also experienced the near
elimination of partisan bias. The average level of bias in the eleven elections
surveyed was a scant 0.1% advantage for the Republican Party. Pennsylvania
had just three elections in which bias was greater than 3% for either party.
Although bias spiked to 8% in favor of the Republican Party in 2004, that
election appears to be an outlier. Redistricting itself led to mixed outcomes on
partisan bias in bipartisan Pennsylvania. Following the 1991 redistricting, bias
was eliminated altogether from an already low 0.1% tilt toward the Democratic
Party. Following the 2001 redistricting, however, bias shifted from a 2%
Democratic edge to a 4.5% Republican edge.
Low levels of partisan bias are not surprising results of bipartisan
redistricting. 144 Because any successful plan requires the input and approval
from both parties (or at the least, from one party and a neutral chairman), the
potential for political mischief and aggressive partisan gerrymanders is greatly
reduced. This result is also consistent with the notion that bipartisan
redistricting typically leads to incumbent-protection plans. 145 As one participant
in Pennsylvania's redistricting process noted, partisan raids on the opposition
are rare and typically occur only after significant horse trading to preserve most
of the incumbent legislators' districts. 146 The results for Pennsylvania are
shown above in Figure 3.
143 See King, supra note 71, at 815-16.
144 See Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 552. This twenty-year
study of state legislative redistricting found that bipartisan redistricting led to the lowest
levels of partisan bias. Id. at 543, 552; see also King, supra note 71, at 815-16.
145 See e.g., King, supra note 71, at 815.
146 Gormley, supra note 142, at 23. Pennsylvania does not have term limits for its state
legislature. The Term Limited States, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx (last updated June 2009).
This might make incumbency protection even more attractive for legislators and the
Reapportionment Commission. Whether the results of this analysis would hold true in a state
that uses bipartisan redistricting in conjunction with term limits remains an area for future
research. One hypothesis is that incumbency protection would be less important in states
with term limits, thereby pushing other redistricting objectives to the fore.
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3. Partisan Redistricting
Figure 4: Ohio House, 1990-2010
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Ohio, with partisan redistricting, experienced near-proportional
representation, with an average electoral responsiveness of "1.05." Redistricting
itself led to mixed results. Following the 1991 redistricting, in which control of
the process switched parties, responsiveness more than doubled in Ohio. In fact,
the resulting election in 1992 offered the highest level of responsiveness for any
Ohio election studied, peaking at "1.47." Yet during the 2001 redistricting,
Republicans drew the lines for a second consecutive cycle, and the opposite
result occurred: electoral responsiveness plummeted by two-thirds. The
resulting 2002 election offered the lowest level of responsiveness for any Ohio
election, bottoming out at "0.45.11147
These twin findings, while limited only to Ohio's experience, suggest the
impact on responsiveness in partisan systems depends on whether one party
maintains control of the process or if control switches hands. In cycles in which
control switches from one party to another, electoral responsiveness will likely
147 Ohio term limits, which first went into effect during the 2000 General Election,
might partially explain this substantial decrease in responsiveness. The Term Limited States,
supra note 146. Partisan mapmakers often carve up term-limited members' districts first,
allowing them to redistribute the voters of those districts to achieve maximum political gain.
See Brian F. Schaffner et al., Incumbents Out, Party In? Term Limits and Partisan
Redistricting in State Legislatures, 4 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 396, 407 (2004). This, in turn,
results in inefficient voter distribution in minority-party districts, see id., which could help
explain the lower responsiveness in the 2002 election. Unlike Ohio, Iowa and Pennsylvania
do not have term limits. The Term Limited States, supra note 146 (listing all states with term
limits, which do not include Iowa or Pennsylvania).
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increase as mapmakers significantly alter the previous district lines to achieve
electoral gains.148 In consecutive cycles in which the same party draws the
lines, responsiveness will decrease dramatically as mapmakers make marginal
incumbents safer by cramming minority-party voters into fewer and fewer
districts.
Partisan redistricting in Ohio led to extreme levels of bias regardless of
which party controlled the process. In the 1990 election-the only one under a
Democratic map--Democrats enjoyed a 13% partisan bias. Following
Republican takeover of the Apportionment Board, bias initially declined to near
zero for the 1992 and 1994 elections. Apparently it took a few cycles for the
new districts to "take effect" on longstanding Democratic officeholders. 149 The
watershed moment for Republicans occurred in 1994; following their takeover
of the Ohio House that year, the GOP experienced bias in their favor in the 6%
range for the remainder of the 1990s. Following a second consecutive
Republican gerrymander, partisan bias increased sharply from 5% in 2000 to
21% in 2002. The 2002 election marked the highest level of partisan bias in any
election in this study. Democrats would have needed to win 71% of the
statewide vote that year to win a majority in the Ohio House. For the ten
elections conducted under a Republican-drawn map, the GOP experienced, on
average, bias in their favor of 4.4%.
These results lend support to earlier findings on state legislative
redistricting. Scholars maintain that bias will be greatest in partisan redistricting
because the party drawing the district lines can manipulate the electoral
inefficiencies of each district to maintain or expand its legislative majority.150
Packing, cracking, and the targeting of incumbent minority party legislators are
all strategies that majority parties have used to instill partisan advantages in
electoral systems. 151 Absent the checks and balances from bipartisan
redistricting or nonpartisan redistricting, partisan bias will remain a common
14 8 See King, supra note 71, at 813-14.
14 9 See Lee Leonard, The End of an Era in Ohio, ST. LEGISLATURES, July 1994, at 24, 27
(speculating that long-serving House Speaker Vern Riffe "worked a miracle" by clinging to
a Democratic majority in 1992 in the face of a Republican-drawn map). Perhaps in Speaker
Rifle's absence, the full effects of the Republican gerrymander in 1991 would have been
apparent sooner. Nevertheless, the 1992 election still represented a dramatic swing in bias
from the 1990 election, albeit from a heavily Democratic bias to zero bias: a 13% change.
150 See Gelman & King, Enhancing Democracy, supra note 68, at 543, 552-53; Gelman
& King, Estimating the Electoral Consequences, supra note 116, at 281-82; King, supra
note 71, at 813-14.
151 See Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. Sc.
REV. 320, 320-21 (1985) (describing various strategies of achieving partisan gains in
redistricting through the manipulation of "electoral inefficiency"). Typical examples include
packing large percentages of Democratic voters into a few inner-city districts to decrease the
overall efficiency of Democratic votes statewide; cracking predominantly Republican
suburbs into multiple districts to dilute the overall efficiency of Republican votes; or
drawing incumbent legislators from the minority party out of their districts altogether in an
effort to disadvantage those legislators. See id.
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feature of partisan redistricting. The results for Ohio are shown above in Figure
4. The composite results are plotted together in Figure 5, below.
Figure 5: Composite Results
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As this analysis demonstrates, and as Figure 5 depicts, only nonpartisan
redistricting is suited to achieve the twin aims of meaningful redistricting
reform: increasing electoral responsiveness and reducing partisan bias. While
bipartisan redistricting also proved capable of reducing partisan bias, it came at
a price-namely, the creation of incumbent-protection gerrymanders which
significantly reduced electoral responsiveness. States pursuing redistricting
reform should not settle for trading one undesirable outcome in the form of
partisan gerrymanders for another in the form of incumbent-protection
gerrymanders. As this study shows, it is possible to establish a redistricting
procedure that fosters elections where voters' choices matter in apportioning
legislative control and both political parties are treated fairly at the ballot box.
The next section sketches the contours of an ideal nonpartisan redistricting
institution and map-making procedure.
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IV. A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: NONPARTISAN REDISTRICTING, CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION, AND LIMITED LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
Because of the Federal Judiciary's reluctance or inability to provide a clear
remedy for partisan gerrymanders, 152 and because congressional redistricting
remains a creature of state law, 153 meaningful efforts to curtail egregious
partisan gerrymandering must be grounded in state constitutional reforms. 154
This section provides a roadmap for those reforms, 155 and based upon the
findings in the empirical analysis from Part III, recommends that states adopt a
nonpartisan redistricting commission to best address the scourge of partisan
gerrymandering.' 56 The commission will be most successful it: (1) is comprised
of experienced, nonpartisan civil servants, and (2) adopts a hybrid approach of
publicly submitted redistricting plans and limited legislative approval of the
final plan. These measures are necessary to instill legitimacy and expertise in
the redistricting process, to encourage public participation, and to ensure
democratic accountability and oversight of the commission's work.
A. Composition of the Nonpartisan Redistricting Commission
A nonpartisan, technocratic redistricting commission housed in a state's
legislative service agency represents the best hope for removing the worst
political avarice from one of democracy's most important tasks. This type of
15 2 See supra Part II.
15 3 Although Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the ultimate
power to regulate congressional elections, including congressional redistricting, the
Constitution places that authority in the hands of state legislatures first, and Congress has
only sparingly used its residual power, leaving congressional redistricting almost entirely to
the states. James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881,886-87 (2006).
154 See id. at 887-89; Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 24, at 554-56.
155 We can categorize reform proposals as either procedural- or substantive-criteria
reforms. See Cox, supra note 52, at 756. Cox assigned different names to these two
categories and added a third "outcome-based regulations" category, but the thrust remains
the same. Reforms can affect either the procedural mechanism for selecting mapmakers and
maps or the substantive criteria that mapmakers must account for when redistricting (i.e.,
contiguity, compactness, preservation of political subdivisions, and so on). See id. Because
contemporary redistricting reforms aimed at curtailing partisan gerrymanders have centered
on procedures, see Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412,
412 (2006), and because a faithful study of substantive-criteria reforms and their effects on
electoral outcomes remains outside the scope of this study, all recommendations are tailored
toward procedural reforms. Future research might isolate substantive requirements like
competitiveness, compactness, or overall fairness to assess their ability to increase electoral
responsiveness and reduce partisan bias.
156 The American Bar Association has also recently endorsed some form of independent
redistricting commission (one outside a state's legislature) as a way to reduce partisan
gerrymandering. See A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT No. 102A, DAILY JOURNAL:
2008 MIDYEAR MEETING (2008).
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redistricting institution would benefit from greater legitimacy, expertise, and
administrative ease than other variations of nonpartisan redistricting
commissions. Additionally, with two important modifications to the submission
and approval process for proposed maps, this type of redistricting institution can
remove political self-dealing from the process while preserving core attributes
of democratic decision making like public participation, scrutiny, and
accountability.
Despite a growing number of states experimenting with a nonpartisan or
independent redistricting process, 157 no consensus exists for who should sit on
the redistricting commission or how those members should be selected. The
majority of reform states have adopted some variation of the citizen redistricting
commission, 158 "assigning the redistricting pen to a set of potentially partisan
citizens not directly beholden to incumbent elected officials." 159 These citizen
commissioners are selected either by sitting elected officials or, in California's
case, through something akin to a jury-selection process. 160 In contrast, Iowa
delegates primary redistricting authority to a nonpartisan staff of legislative
service employees-experienced civil servants who already play a neutral,
supporting role for the legislature in its day-to-day operations.
161
There are clear benefits of assigning redistricting authority to a nonpartisan
body of civil servants with legislative experience as opposed to a group of
everyday citizens who are selected once a decade to perform the task. The
relative legitimacy, expertise, and administrative ease associated with a
nonpartisan, technocratic commission all suggest the Iowa model is a better
vehicle for redistricting reform. First, a technocratic commission offers a strong
defense to any accusations of lingering partisanship or political interference
with the redistricting process. 162 Since legislative service agencies already
perform their roles in a politically neutral manner, and since legislative service
staff members are not dependent on appointment from elected officials like
157Six states now place primary authority for drawing congressional districts in the
hands of a nonpartisan or independent group of actors: Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, and Washington. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, §§ 1-3;
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; IOWA CODE §§ 42.2-42.4 (2011); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2)
(Montana only has one congressional seat and therefore does not employ its redistricting
commission; the commission would presumably function in the future if Montana were to
gain congressional seats); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43.
15 8 See National Overview of Redistricting: Who Draws the Lines?, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/who-draws the linesl (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012) (outlining the various independent redistricting commissions states currently
employ).
159 Levitt, supra note 10, at 532.
160 See id. at 534-38 (discussing citizen redistricting commissions currently in use).
161 See Cook, supra note 111, at 3.
162 See Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating
Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L.J. 184, 194 (2007).
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most citizen redistricting commissions, allegations of partisan motives seem
wanting. 163
Secondly, a technocratic commission offers expertise and a reservoir of
institutional knowledge that a citizen commission is unlikely to obtain.
Redistricting is an inherently specialized endeavor involving complex, often
conflicting considerations like population counts, compactness of districts,
racial and ethnic considerations, partisan composition, county and municipal
boundaries, and preservation of communities of shared interests. 164 In short,
these are just the type of complicated decisions to which we might traditionally
defer to a body of experts to sort through. 165 In addition to having a base of
expertise from which to operate, a technocratic commission housed in a
legislative service agency would also maintain redistricting knowledge better
than a one-and-done citizen commission. Institutional memory and the
accumulation of best practices from prior redistricting cycles would add to the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the nonpartisan commission.
Finally, from an administrative standpoint, the transition to a technocratic
redistricting commission comprised of legislative service agency staffers would
be noticeably less cumbersome than a transition to a citizen commission. The
infrastructure, funding, staffing, and logistical pieces are already in place for a
commission of legislative service agency experts. No additional burden is
placed upon the state to initiate the redistricting process. Contrast with a citizen
redistricting commission like those in Arizona or California which entail
convoluted, time-consuming selection processes; 166 require independent
163 Indeed, since Iowa enacted its redistricting procedure in 1980, the Iowa Legislature
has approved a legislative service agency plan without substantive modification each time,
and no one has ever filed suit challenging an enacted plan. See Cook, supra note 111, at 3.
Contrast with Arizona's Independent Redistricting Commission-a citizen commission with
four of five members appointed by legislative leaders (with an independent chairperson)--
which has experienced great tumult and failed to deflect accusations of overt partisanship or
lawsuits. See Pitzl, supra note 7, at Al.164 See Gardner, supra note 153, at 894-97.
165 Cf Gerken, supra note 162, at 194. Some scholars, however, argue that a citizen
commission is better suited to address these competing concerns. See Levitt, supra note 10,
at 537-39. But this assumption is predicated on the false notion that the nonpartisan
commission would also be charged with establishing which substantive redistricting criteria
to use and in which hierarchy to value them. See id at 540-41. Yet as the Iowa experience
instructs, the elected legislature still makes those value choices. See IOWA CODE § 42.4
(2011) (articulating explicit redistricting standards to follow). The Legislative Service
Agency staff merely works within that guidance to produce legislative maps that are free of
self-dealing. See Cook, supra note 111, at 3.166 See Aiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)-(13) (explaining that the Arizona Commission
on Appellate Court Appointments solicits applications for the Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission and forwards a pool of twenty-five nominees-ten Democrats, ten
Republicans, and five unaffiliated voters-to the state's four legislative leaders, who each
have a seven-day window to make an appointment from the pool; those four core members
of the redistricting commission must then select, by a majority vote, one of the five
unaffiliated applicants from the eligible pool to serve as the commission's chairperson);
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funding sources for office space, staffing, equipment, and contracting; 167 and
must be constituted anew for each redistricting cycle. 168
Despite these obvious advantages to a technocratic form of nonpartisan
redistricting commission, it is not a panacea for every state. States without a
full-time, professional legislature aided by a nonpartisan legislative service
agency would be better served by a citizen commission. 169 Even for states with
a nonpartisan legislative service agency, this proposal remains open to
criticisms that redistricting might become too removed from public
participation, scrutiny, and accountability. 170 In other words, by removing the
more perverse political elements from redistricting, the process will
simultaneously forego some beneficial attributes of democratic decision
making. 171 Although these criticisms are valid, they are easily overcome by
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c) (explaining that the California Citizens Redistricting
Commission consists of fourteen members-five Democrats, five Republicans, and four
unaffiliated voters); CAL Gov'T CODE § 8252 (West 2012) (explaining that the state auditor
and an Applicant Review Panel solicit applications and forward to the state's four legislative
leaders three pools of eligible applicants consisting of twenty members each-twenty
Democrats, twenty Republicans, and twenty unaffiliated voters; each legislative leader may
then "strike" two applicants from each pool, potentially leaving twelve members in each
pool; the state auditor then randomly selects eight members from the pools-three
Democrats, three Republicans, and two unaffiliated voters; those eight appointees become
the core members of the redistricting commission and must then appoint an additional six
members from the remaining members of the pools: two more Democrats, two more
Republicans, and two more unaffiliated voters; finally the core appointees select the final six
commission members to reflect the diversity of the State of California, and each of the six
final appointments requires an affirmative vote of five core members, including at least two
Democratic votes, two Republican votes, and two unaffiliated votes).167 ARiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(18)-(21); CAL GOv'T CODE § 8253(a)(5)-(7) (West
2012).
168 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(23); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(a).
169 Without a nonpartisan legislative service agency in place, many of the advantages of
this proposal vanish. For those states, one option is to constitute a technocratic commission
from scratch, perhaps by enlisting academics and geographers. The other alternative is to
follow the lead of states like California and Washington in creating nonpartisan commissions
of interested citizens.
170 See Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668 (2006) (arguing that any nonpartisan
redistricting commission would unnecessarily shield the process from public engagement
and oversight); cf Gerken, supra note 162, at 194-95 (discussing electoral reform
commissions more generally and arguing that technocratic commissions are susceptible to
charges of being "antidemocratic or out of touch" and that some infusion of common
knowledge or "everyday politics" can successfully inoculate nonpartisan, expert
commissions from those criticisms).
171 See Kang, supra note 170, at 690; see also Levitt, supra note 10, at 537-38 (arguing
citizen commissions are preferable because it is expected that redistricting institutions must
engage in "substantially political task[s]").
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structuring the process of map submission and approval in a way that
encourages public participation and provides for democratic oversight. 172
As the next section explains, by coupling a nonpartisan, technocratic
redistricting commission with an open submission process-whereby any
interested party could submit a proposed map for scoring based upon the
substantive criteria the state has adopted-redistricting would benefit from the
legitimacy and expertise of the technocratic commission while simultaneously
fostering public participation and engagement. Moreover, by maintaining a
limited form of legislative approval of the final map, the process would still
have the advantages of democratic accountability and oversight.
B. Procedure for Enacting a Redistricting Plan
Infusing a nonpartisan, technocratic redistricting commission with strong
citizen participation and limited oversight from an elected legislature is a
compelling vehicle for reform. Indeed, states have already enacted or
experimented with key components of this reform package piecemeal and have
achieved noticeable success. Combining the disparate elements into one
coherent redistricting institution would build on those successes and provide a
powerful alternative to blatant partisan gerrymandering. The process would
incorporate elements from Iowa's nonpartisan redistricting system, 173 from
Ohio's recent public redistricting contests, 174 and from Washington's
independent redistricting system, which allows the legislature a final "tweak" to
modify the independent commission's proposed plan. 175
172 Iowa already provides for public engagement through the use of a citizens' advisory
panel which conducts public hearings and solicits input on any proposed plan prior to its
enactment. IOWA CODE §§ 42.5-42.6 (2011). Iowa's redistricting process also provides for
democratic oversight and accountability by requiring legislative endorsement of any
proposed redistricting plan. Id. § 42.3.
1 7 3 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
174 The Ohio Campaign for Accountable Redistricting recently conducted a citizen
redistricting competition in which interested parties submitted their own maps for
assessment based on a pre-determined set of objective scoring criteria (primarily centered
upon Ohio's actual substantive criteria for redistricting). See Ohio Redistricting Competition
Rules and Scoring, OHIO CAMPAIGN FOR ACCOUNTABLE REDISTRICTING, 3-16 (2011)
http://www.moneyinpoliticsohio.org/competition/rules2.pdf. This competition generated
statewide attention and produced legislative and congressional redistricting proposals that
were far more politically competitive and geographically compact than the gerrymandered
districts the Ohio Apportionment Board and legislature adopted. See Joe Hallett, Coalition
Spokesman Advocates Fairer Redistricting, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 2011, at B2.
Interestingly, a Republican state legislator from Illinois won the competition for both the
congressional map and the state legislative maps. Jim Siegel, Map Wins for Fair-
Redistricting Plan, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2011, at B3; Jim Siegel, Dems Offer
Redistricting Drawn by Illinois Republican, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2011, at B5.
175 The Washington State Legislature is permitted to modify its independent redistricting
commission's proposed plans, but only if the adjustments affect no more than two percent of
a district's population, and only if two-thirds of each chamber votes in favor of the
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1. The Nonpartisan Redistricting Commission 's "Best Effort" Map
This model redistricting process would begin, much like in Iowa, with a
state's legislative service agency (the "technocratic commission") crafting a
proposed congressional map in accordance with the substantive redistricting
criteria outlined in the state's constitution.1 76 Delegating the first crack at
redistricting to a nonpartisan, technocratic commission removes the potential
for partisan gerrymandering and self-interest among legislators. It also places a
premium on the legitimacy and expertise of the process. 177 The technocratic
commission's proposal would represent the state's "best effort" map and would
serve as a starting point for the follow-on public redistricting competition.
2. Citizen Participation: The Public Redistricting Competition
To ensure citizen participation and transparency, the commission would
also conduct a public redistricting competition, much like the recent effort in
Ohio, 178 by making mapping software available to the public and soliciting
citizen-submitted maps. The commission would then evaluate every map
submitted, including its own "best effort" map, and select for further
consideration the three proposals that score the highest on objective
measurements of the state's substantive redistricting criteria.179 By opening the
redistricting process to the public in such a straightforward and meaningful
way, states will send a strong signal to their electorates that the bad old days of
back-room deals and secretive redistricting negotiations are finished.180
modification. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.100 (West
2012). Since legislators do tend to know their districts best, "[a]llowing the legislature a final
opportunity to tweak commission lines may both facilitate the passage of redistricting reform
in the first place, and permit an escape valve to correct unintended negative consequences of
particular redistricting decisions." CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING, supra note 90, at 77.176 Again, any "value choices" for which substantive redistricting criteria to adopt and in
which order to prioritize them will be left to the states' citizens and elected officials. The
redistricting institution will merely operate within those express confines. See CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING, supra note 90, at 78.177 See supra Part V.A.
178 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. In the Ohio competition, interested
participants registered online and were given access to census tract data, mapping software,
and redistricting requirements and scoring criteria; participants then e-mailed their proposals
back to the competition's hosts for scoring. See id.179 Although three proposals seems at first blush like an arbitrary number, this provision
provides the legislature with some flexibility in approving a final map while not
overwhelming legislators with a laundry list of potential redistricting proposals. States could,
of course, increase or decrease this number as they deem fit.
180 Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Ohio Republican John
Boehner, dictated much of the Buckeye State's 2011 redistricting process away from public
view through emails from his Washington consultants to a pair of Ohio-based redistricting
staffers who were holed up in a taxpayer-funded hotel room. See Aaron Marshall, Boehner
Aide Was Calling the Shots on Ohio Redistricting, Emails Show: Coalition's Report Details
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Moreover, "[by] establish[ing] a pool of 'winners,' rather than a single winning
plan," from the competition, this system ensures some flexibility in the
decision-making process to account for factors that do not easily lend
themselves to objective measurements. 181
3. Limited Legislative Oversight and Approval
Next, to maintain democratic accountability and oversight, the commission
would forward the three highest-scoring proposals to the legislature for
consideration. At this point, the legislature may enact one of the three plans and
forward it to the Governor for signature or, if necessary, may tweak one of the
existing plans prior to enacting it, much like Washington's independent
redistricting process. 182 As in Washington, the legislature would be limited to
how drastically it can modify any of the existing plans (somewhere less than
two percent of any district's population), and any modification would require a
two-thirds vote of both chambers. 183
This combination of legislative constraint and discretion serves three
important goals. First and foremost, it removes the potential for blatant partisan
gerrymanders. With a limited menu of baseline redistricting maps from which
to choose, the legislature could not act with unbridled self-interest or partisan
extremism. Secondly, by vesting the legislature with some control and
participation in the process, this set-up removes the pitfalls of redistricting by
automation, 184 and shields the process from charges that it lacks democratic
accountability and oversight. Additionally, in order for legislators to agree to
concede primary control of redistricting, they will likely want some form of
final endorsement, and this proposal assures their continued involvement in the
redistricting process.
4. A Self-Executing Provision
Should the legislature and Governor fail to approve any of the three plans
within a specified time period, then the commission would have the power to
enact its own choice from among the three proposals, as originally submitted.
This self-executing provision discourages delay tactics designed to throw the
Behind-the-Scenes Influence, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 13, 2011, at Al. Democrats
in Washington, D.C. also tried to influence the redistricting process by providing guidance,
feedback, and encouragement to Illinois's legislative leaders as they proceeded to enact a
partisan gerrymander. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
181 Levitt, supra note 10, at 528-29. One example might be including notable landmarks
or symbolic attractions within a particular district.182 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
183 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 44.05.100 (West 2012).
184 See Levitt, supra note 10, at 522-26.
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redistricting process into the judicial system. 185 It also gives legislators a strong
incentive to approve one of the plans, lest they lose any say in the process by
sending the final determination back to the redistricting commission or subject
themselves to "public outcry" for bucking the recommendations of the
nonpartisan commission. 186
This model redistricting proposal marks a necessary compromise. On the
one hand, we must shield redistricting from the baser elements of politics to
achieve overarching goals like increasing electoral responsiveness and reducing
partisan bias. On the other hand, redistricting should not occur in a vacuum,
removed from public participation, scrutiny, and accountability. To achieve that
balance, the process necessarily involves several stages of redistricting actors
and actions. One concern is that a complicated reform proposal might be
difficult to explain to low-information voters 187 who must approve of any
changes to a state's redistricting procedures. However, the actual content of
redistricting reforms seems to have little impact on their fate at the polls. 188
Recent reform efforts that have succeeded at the ballot box all involve some
level of complexity, whether in the selection of redistricting commission
members1 89 or the procedures for adopting a redistricting plan.190 Scholarly
185 Iowa also has a backup plan in case the legislature fails to approve one of the
Legislative Service Agency's maps, but under that system, the Iowa Supreme Court assumes
all responsibility for redistricting. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 35. Determined partisans in the
legislature could abuse such an arrangement if they felt the Judiciary would lend a friendly
ear. Keeping the self-executing provision within the nonpartisan commission removes
further temptation for partisan gain. Washington's independent redistricting commission
does not require legislative endorsement; legislative tweaks are permissive, but in their
absence, the commission's plan is self-executing. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7).
18 6 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1366, 1388-89 (2005)
(discussing how "singularly effective" advisory redistricting commissions have been in
foreign countries and in Iowa and describing how legislators are reluctant to go against
commission proposals).
187 See Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2010) ("[V]oters tend to care about substantive outcomes,
not process reforms.").
188 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, AM. CONST. Soc'Y L. & POL'Y 21-22
(Mar. 2007), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stephanopoulos - Redistricting_
InitiativesMarch_2007.pdf (examining redistricting reform initiatives that succeeded during
the past century and finding "the actual content of a redistricting initiative also has little
impact" on the measure's success or failure at the polls).
189 Arizona and California both succeeded in passing redistricting reforms through
popular initiative. Ann Eschinger et al., Op-Ed., Redistricting Is Balance in Goals, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, July 18, 2011, at B7; PolitiCal, California Passes Prop. 20, Redistricting Reform,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2010, 9:49 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/Califomia-
politics/2010/1l/califomia-passes-prop-20-redistricting-reform.html. Both states adopted
complicated mechanisms for selecting redistricting commission members. See supra note
166 and accompanying text.
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reform proposals also involve complex balancing between redistricting actors
and the requirements for adoption of a particular plan. 191 Complexity, therefore,
is not the natural enemy of reform.
States remain laboratories of democracy, free to experiment with new and
better solutions to meet the exigencies of the times. The proposal detailed above
might not be a seamless fix for the many faces of redistricting politics and
redistricting reform. Indeed, no solution can fit perfectly with the idiosyncrasies
of each state's politics or its polity. What this proposal offers is a clear
roadmap, grounded in empirical research, for addressing the invidious
consequences of redistricting's original sin: the partisan gerrymander.
Placing primary redistricting authority in the hands of a commission of
nonpartisan, technocratic mapmakers signals a state's emphasis on legitimacy
and expertise in drawing its representational boundaries. Opening the process
and redistricting resources to any interested citizen ensures public participation
and transparency. Finally, maintaining limited legislative oversight guarantees
some flexibility, and most importantly, democratic accountability for one of
democracy's fundamental tasks. Enacting some, or all, of these suggestions will
go a long way to reforming redistricting and, in the process, our government
itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts, while not new to
American politics, has become so pervasive and so egregious that it now
threatens the ability of the federal government to carry out its essential
functions. Districts drawn for the sole purpose of advantaging one political
party or onc incumbent legislator not only deny voters a meaningful choice in
who will represent them in Congress, they also force congressional candidates
to tack to the ideological extremes just to survive the primary election. This in
turn leads to ideologically entrenched members of Congress and crippling
political polarization within our nation's capitol.
We can, and we must, do better. Although the Judiciary has proven
ineffective at preventing or remedying the harmful effects of partisan
gerrymanders, state constitutional reforms provide hope. As this Note
empirically demonstrates, states that transition to a nonpartisan redistricting
190Arizona requires its Independent Redistricting Commission to propose a plan,
undertake traditional public notice and comment procedures, and respond to legislative
recommendations. ARiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)-(17). California's process
contemplates at least three different decision-making stages: redistricting commission
approval, citizen referendum, and California Supreme Court appointment of special masters
in the event of the commission's failure to adopt a plan. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(g)-(j).
191 See CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING, supra note 90, at 74-83. See generally
Elmendorf, supra note 186 (advocating advisory redistricting commissions to work in
conjunction with state legislatures); Kang, supra note 170 (arguing redistricting maps should
be subject to public referendum).
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procedure are more likely to engender elections that are responsive to voters'
choices and that treat both political parties fairly in the translation of statewide
vote totals to their share of congressional seats. Indeed, responsive and fair
elections remain an attainable dream-not a lost cause.
The key components of a successful, nonpartisan redistricting reform
proposal already exist, albeit piecemeal. States pursuing reform would do well
to combine those disparate components into one coherent redistricting
institution. Combining a nonpartisan redistricting commission, a citizen
redistricting competition, and limited legislative oversight and approval of the
final congressional map would achieve what no other redistricting reform
purports to accomplish: removing political avarice from an inherently and
irreconcilably political process. By shielding the mapmaking process from
partisan actors who are focused on self-interest and political gain while
simultaneously fostering transparency, public participation, and democratic
oversight, this redistricting institution and mapmaking procedure offer a
credible, attainable counter to the invidious consequences of partisan
gerrymandering.
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APPENDIX
Figure 6: A Tale of Two Congresional Maps
-
The map on the left is Ohio's enacted congressional map, approved by the
Ohio General Assembly, for the 2012-2020 elections. The map on the right was
the winning proposal from among over fifty citizen entries in the "Ohio
Redistricting Competition," a public redistricting competition conducted in
2011 by the Ohio Campaign for Accountable Redistricting. 192
[Tabular material on following page]
192 Both maps and detailed information about the Ohio Redistricting Competition are
available online. Draw the Line Ohio, DRAW THE LINE MIDWEST,
http://drawthelinemidwest.org/ohio/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
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Table 1: Electoral Responsiveness and Partisan Bias Data
" " ~~Rbspbnsive- .2AState Year Bias Standard Error
ness
IA 1990 2.01 0.013 0.14
IA- 1992 2.27 0,003 0.12
IA 1994 1.53 -0.022 0.08
I:.'A 1996 1.49 
-0.01 0.08
IA 1998 2 -0.005 0.14
IA 2000 1.27' -0043 0.23
IA 2002 2.42 0 0.18
IA 2004 1.16 -0.017 0.12.
IA 2006 0.66 0.021 0.07
IA 2008 1 .05. .04 0.1
IA 2010 1.73 0.043 0.15
OH 1990 0.71 0.134 0.07
OH 1I992 1.47 -0.003 0.09'
OH 1994 1.36 0.008 0.14
OH 1996 0.86 -0.081 0.09
OH 1998 0.83 -0.066 0.07
OH4 2000 1.8 -0.055 00
OH 2002 0.45 -0.21 0.13
OH 2004 1.32 -0.053 0.13
OH 2006 1.21 -0.033 0.11
OH 2008 0.81 0.031 0.07
OH 2010 1.1 -0.028 0.06
PA 1990 1.34 0.008 0.07
PA 1992 1.1 0 0.07
PA 1994 0.74 0.028 0.09
PA 1996 0.65 -0.023 0.04
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[Continued from previous page]
State Year Responsive- Bias Standard Error.
ness
PA 1998 0.47 0.011 0.05
PA 2000 0.54 "0.019 ' 0.05
PA 2002 0.55 -0.045 0.05
PA 2004 0.31 -0.08 ! 0.02
PA 2006 0.57 0.028 0.04
PA 2008 0.59 0.011 Z..0.05
PA 2010 0.61 0.031 0.05
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